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Abstract
We introduce a new rounding technique designed for online optimization problems, which is related
to contention resolution schemes, a technique initially introduced in the context of submodular function
maximization. Our rounding technique, which we call online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs),
is applicable to many online selection problems, including Bayesian online selection, oblivious posted
pricing mechanisms, and stochastic probing models. It allows for handling a wide set of constraints,
and shares many strong properties of offline contention resolution schemes. In particular, OCRSs for
different constraint families can be combined to obtain an OCRS for their intersection. Moreover, we
can approximately maximize submodular functions in the online settings we consider.
We, thus, get a broadly applicable framework for several online selection problems, which improves
on previous approaches in terms of the types of constraints that can be handled, the objective functions
that can be dealt with, and the assumptions on the strength of the adversary. Furthermore, we resolve
two open problems from the literature; namely, we present the first constant-factor constrained oblivious
posted price mechanism for matroid constraints, and the first constant-factor algorithm for weighted
stochastic probing with deadlines.
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1 Introduction
Recently, interest has surged in Bayesian and stochastic online optimization problems. These are problems
where we can use limited a priori information to select elements arriving online, often subject to classical
combinatorial constraints such as matroids, matchings and knapsack constraints. Examples include posted
pricing mechanisms [8, 24, 18], prophet inequalities [18], probing models [17, 1], stochastic matchings [3],
and secretary problems [2, 20, 15].1 Simultaneous with this development, interest has arose also in gener-
alizing the optimization of linear objective functions to relevant nonlinear objective functions. A particular
focus was set on submodular functions, which is a function class that captures the property of diminishing
returns, a very natural property in many of the above-mentioned settings [21, 1, 4, 16].
A very successful approach for these problems is based on first using the a priori information to formu-
late an (often linear) relaxation whose optimal fractional solution x∗ upper bounds the performance of any
online (or even offline) algorithm. Then, x∗ is used to devise an online algorithm whose goal is to recover
a solution of a similar objective value as x∗. Such an online algorithm can also be interpreted as an online
rounding procedure for rounding x∗. In particular, online rounding approaches have recently been used to
obtain nearly optimal and surprisingly elegant results for stochastic matchings (see Bansal et al. [3]), and for
a very general probing model introduced by Gupta and Nagarajan [17] with applications in posted pricing
mechanisms, online matching problems and beyond.
A key ingredient in the general rounding algorithms presented in [17] are so-called contention resolution
schemes (CRSs), a rounding technique introduced by Chekuri et al. [10] in the context of (offline) submodu-
lar function maximization. CRSs are defined with respect to a constraint family, like matroids, matching, or
knapsack constraints. Interestingly, the existence of a so-called ordered CRS for the given constraint family
is all that is needed to apply the techniques of [17]. Whereas this generality is very appealing, there are some
inherent barriers in current CRSs that hinder a broader applicability to online settings beyond the probing
model defined in [17]. More precisely, most settings considered in [17] require that the algorithm can choose
the order in which to obtain new online information about an underlying ground set over which the objective
is optimized. This is due to the fact that most CRSs need to round the components of a fractional point x∗
step by step in a particular order.
In this paper we introduce a stronger notion of contention resolution schemes that overcomes this restric-
tion and allows for the online information to be presented adversarially. We show that such schemes exist
for many interesting constraint families, including matroid constraints and knapsack constraints. As we dis-
cuss in Section 1.3, this leads to a broadly applicable online rounding framework that works in considerably
more general settings than previous approaches. Furthermore, our techniques answer two open problems
from the literature: we show the existence of a constrained oblivious posted-pricing mechanism (COPM)
for matroids, intersection of matroids, and further constraints families (a question first raised in [8]); and
we get an O(1)-competitive algorithm for the weighted probing problem with deadlines introduced in [17].
Additionally, our rounding approach yields optimal guarantees (up to moderate constant factors) for a class
of online submodular function maximization problems.
Before we formally define our rounding framework (Section 1.1), state our results (Section 1.2) and
describe the aforementioned applications (Section 1.3), it is helpful to introduce our rounding framework
in the light of a concrete example. Consider the following Bayesian online selection problem studied by
Kleinberg and Weinberg [18] in the context of prophet inequalities. There is a finite set N of items or
elements, and a nonnegative random variable Ze for each e ∈ N , where all {Ze}e∈N are independent. The
distributions of all Ze are known and for simplicity we assume they are continuous. Furthermore, a matroid
1Strictly speaking, secretary problems have no a priori information. However, as items arrive in a random order, most algorithms
first observe a fraction of the elements (serving as the a priori information), and then devise an online strategy based on this
information.
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M = (N,F) on N is given.2 Let {ze}e∈N be realizations of the random variables {Ze}e∈N . The goal is to
select a subset I ⊆ N of the elements that is independent, i.e., I ∈ F , and whose value z(I) :=
∑
e∈E ze
is as large as possible. The way how elements can be selected works as follows. Elements e ∈ N reveal
one by one their realization ze, in a fixed prespecified order that is unknown to the algorithm. Whenever a
value ze is revealed, one has to choose whether to select e or discard it, before the next element reveals its
realization.
A natural way to approach this problem is to define a threshold te ≥ 0 for each e ∈ N and only accept
elements e ∈ N whose realization is at least the threshold, i.e., ze ≥ te; we call such elements active. Let
xe be the probability of e being active, i.e., xe = Pr[Ze ≥ te]. Notice that the set of all active elements
is distributed like a random set that contains each element e independently with probability xe. We denote
such a set by R(x). As we show in Section 4, using a convex relaxation one can find thresholds te such that:
(i) x = (xe)e∈N is in the matroid polytope PF ,3 and (ii) an algorithm that disregards the matroid constraint
and accepts any active element would have an expected return at least as good as the one of an optimal
offline algorithm.
Our goal is to design an online algorithm that only selects active elements, such that an independent set
I is obtained where Pr[e ∈ I] ≥ c · xe for all e ∈ E, where c ∈ (0, 1] is a constant as large as possible.
It is not hard to check that such a procedure would lead to an objective value of at least c times the offline
optimum. The guarantee we are seeking closely resembles the notion of c-balanced CRSs as defined in [10],
which is an offline algorithm that depends on x and returns for any set S ⊆ N a (potentially random) subset
π(S) ⊆ S with π(S) ∈ F such that Pr[e ∈ π(R(x))] ≥ c · xe. The only reason why this procedure is
not applicable in the above context is that, in general, π needs to know the realization of the full set R(x)
in advance to determine π(R(x)). However, R(x) is revealed element by element in the above selection
problem. A key observation in [17] is that some CRSs do not need to know the full set R(x) upfront, but
can round step by step if the elements come in some prescribed order chosen by the algorithm. However, in
the above setting, as in many other combinatorial online problems, the order cannot be chosen freely.
We overcome this limitation through a considerably stronger notion of CRSs, which we call online
contention resolution schemes (OCRSs).
1.1 Online contention resolution schemes
OCRSs, like classical contention resolution schemes, are defined with respect to a relaxation of the feasible
sets of a combinatorial optimization problem. Consider a finite ground set N = {e1, . . . , en}, and a family
of feasible subsets F ⊆ 2N , which is down-closed, i.e., if I ∈ F and J ⊆ I then J ∈ F . Let PF ⊆ [0, 1]N
be the polytope corresponding to the feasible sets F , i.e., PF is the convex hull of all characteristic vectors
of feasible sets:
PF = conv({1F | I ∈ F}) .
We highlight that throughout this paper we focus on down-closed feasibility constraints.
Definition 1.1 (relaxation). We say that a polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]N is a relaxation of PF if it contains the same
{0, 1}-points, i.e., P ∩ {0, 1}N = PF ∩ {0, 1}N .
We start by defining online contention resolution schemes (OCRS) simply as algorithms that can be
applied to the online selection problem highlighted in the introduction. The performance of an OCRS is
then characterized by additional properties that we define later.
2We recall that a matroid M = (N,F) consists of a finite ground set N and a nonempty family F ⊆ 2N of subsets of N
satisfying: (i) If I ∈ F , J ⊆ I , then J ∈ F , and (ii) if I, J ∈ F , |J | > |I |, then ∃e ∈ J \ I with I ∪ {e} ∈ F . If not stated
otherwise, we assume that matroids are given by an independence oracle that, for every I ⊆ N , returns whether I ∈ F .
3The matroid polytope PF is the convex hull of all characteristic vectors of independent sets. In particular it can be described
by PF = {x ∈ RN≥0 | x(S) ≤ rank(S) ∀S ⊆ N}, where rank(S) = max{|I | | I ⊆ S, I ∈ F} is the rank function of M .
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Definition 1.2 (Online contention resolutions scheme (OCRS)). Let us consider the following online selec-
tion setting. A point x ∈ P is given and let R(x) be a random subset of active elements. The elements
e ∈ N reveal one by one whether they are active, i.e., e ∈ R(x), and the decision whether to select an active
element is taken irrevocably before the next element is revealed. An OCRS for P is an online algorithm that
selects a subset I ⊆ R(x) such that 1I ∈ P .
Most of the OCRSs that we present follow a common algorithmic theme, which leads us to the definition
of greedy OCRS.
Definition 1.3 (Greedy OCRS). Let P ⊆ [0, 1]N be a relaxation for the feasible sets F ⊆ 2N . A greedy
OCRS π for P is an OCRS that for any x ∈ P defines a down-closed subfamily of feasible sets Fπ,x ⊆ F ,
and an element e is selected when it arrives if, together with the already selected elements, the obtained set
is in Fπ,x.
If the choice of Fπ,x given x is randomized, we talk about a randomized greedy OCRS; otherwise, we
talk about a deterministic greedy OCRS. We also simplify notation and abbreviate Fπ,x by Fx when the
OCRS π is clear from the context.
For simplicity of presentation, and because all our main results are based on greedy OCRSs, we restrict
our attention to this class of OCRSs, and focus on greedy OCRSs when defining and analyzing properties.
As mentioned in the example shown in the introduction, a desirable property of OCRSs would be that
every element e ∈ N gets selected with probability at least c · xe for a constant c > 0 as large as possible.
This property is called c-balancedness in the context of classical contention resolution schemes. However,
to be precise about such properties in the online context that we consider, one has to specify the power of the
adversary who chooses the order of the elements. Adversaries of different strengths have been considered in
various online settings. For example, one arguably weak type of adversary is an offline adversary, who has
to choose the order of the elements upfront, before any elements get revealed. On the other end, the most
powerful adversary that can be considered is what we call the almighty adversary; an almighty adversary
knows upfront the outcomes of all random events, which includes the realization of R(x) and the outcome
of the random bits that the algorithm may query. An almighty adversary can thus calculate exactly how
the algorithm will behave and reveal the elements in a worst case order. A typical adversary type that is
in between these two extremes is an online adversary, who can choose the next element to reveal online
depending on what happened so far; thus, it has the same information as the online algorithm. Throughout
this paper, when not indicated otherwise, we assume to play against the almighty adversary.
In the context of greedy OCRSs, we define a considerably stronger notion than c-balancedness, which
we call c-selectability, and which leads to results even against the almighty adversary. In words, a greedy
OCRS is c-selectable if with probability at least c, the random set R(x) is such that an element e is selected
no matter what other elements I of R(x) have been selected so far as long as I ∈ Fx. Thus, it guarantees
that an element is selected with probability at least c against any (even the almighty) adversary.
Definition 1.4 (c-selectability). Let c ∈ [0, 1]. A greedy OCRS for P is c-selectable if for any x ∈ P we
have
Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fx ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fx] ≥ c ∀e ∈ N .
We highlight that the probability in Definition 1.4 is over the random outcomes of R(x) when dealing
with a deterministic greedy OCRS; when the greedy OCRS is randomized, then the probability is over R(x)
and the random choice of Fx. We call an element e ∈ N selectable for a particular realization of R(x) and
random choice of Fx if I ∪ {e} ∈ Fx for all I ⊆ R(x) with I ∈ Fx.
As aforementioned, the c-selectability is a very strong property that implies guarantees against any
adversary. Despite this strong definition, we show that Ω(1)-selectable greedy OCRSs exist for many natural
constraints.
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Often, a larger factor c can be achieved when x is supposed to be in a down-scaled version of P . This is
similar to the situation in classical contention resolution schemes.
Definition 1.5 ((b, c)-selectability). Let b, c ∈ [0, 1]. A greedy OCRS for P is (b, c)-selectable if for any
x ∈ b · P we have
Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fx ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fx] ≥ c ∀e ∈ N .
Notice that a (b, c)-selectable greedy OCRS implies a randomized bc-selectable greedy OCRS because
we can “scale down” x online by only considering each element e with probability b independent of the
other elements.
Observation 1.6. A (b, c)-selectable greedy OCRS for P implies a (randomized) bc-selectable greedy OCRS
for P .
The existence of OCRSs is interesting even regardless of efficiency issues. Still, in many applications it
is important to have efficient OCRSs.
Definition 1.7 (efficiency). A greedy OCRS π is efficient if there exists a polynomial time algorithm that, for
a given input x, samples an efficient independence oracle for the set Fπ,x. That is, an oracle that answers
in polynomial time queries of the form: is a set S ⊆ N in Fπ,x?
We next summarize our technical results before highlighting the implications of our results to various
online settings.
1.2 Our results
Our first technical result proves the existence of greedy OCRSs with constant selectability for relaxations
of several interesting families of constraints. All the greedy OCRSs described by Theorem 1.8 are either
efficient, or can be made efficient at the cost of an arbitrarily small constant ε > 0 loss in the selectability
guarantee.
Theorem 1.8. There exist:
• For every b ∈ [0, 1], a (b, 1− b)-selectable deterministic greedy OCRS for matroid polytopes.
• For every b ∈ [0, 1], a (b, e−2b)-selectable randomized greedy OCRS for matching polytopes.4
• For every b ∈ [0, 1/2], a (b, 1−2b2−2b)-selectable randomized greedy OCRS for the natural relaxation of a
knapsack constraint.
Interestingly, it turns out that there is no (b, c)-selectable deterministic greedy OCRS for the natural re-
laxation of a knapsack constraint for any constants b and c. This stands in contrast to the case of the matching
polytope, for which the randomized greedy OCRS given by Theorem 1.8 can be made deterministic at the
cost of only a small loss in the selectability.
Like offline CRSs, greedy OCRSs can be combined to form greedy OCRSs for more involved con-
straints.
Theorem 1.9. If π1 is a (b, c1)-selectable greedy OCRS for a polytope P1, and π2 is a (b, c2)-selectable
greedy OCRS for a polytope P2, then there exists a (b, c1 · c2)-selectable greedy OCRS for the polytope
P1 ∩ P2. Moreover, the last greedy OCRS is efficient if π1 and π2 are.
4Our greedy OCRS works also for a weaker relaxation of matching which only bounds the degree of each node.
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Notice that Theorem 1.9 can be applied repeatedly to combine several OCRSs. Thus, Theorems 1.8
and 1.9 prove together the existence of constant selectability greedy OCRSs for any constant intersection of
matroid, matching and knapsack constraints.
It is easy to see that, given a non-negative increasing linear objective function, a (b, c)-selectable greedy
OCRS for a polytope P can be used to round online a vector x ∈ bP while losing only a factor of c in the
objective. Theorem 1.10 proves this result formally, and extends it to nonnegative submodular5 functions.
To state this theorem, we need to define some notation. Given a function f : 2N → R, the multilinear
extension of f is a function F : [0, 1]N → R whose value for a vector x ∈ [0, 1]N is F (x) = E[f(R(x))].
Informally, F (x) is the expected value of f over a set obtained by randomly rounding every coordinate of x
independently.
Theorem 1.10. Given a nonnegative monotone6 submodular function f : 2N → R≥0 and a (b, c)-selectable
greedy OCRS for a polytope P , applying the greedy OCRS to an input x ∈ bP results in a random set S
satisfying E[f(S)] ≥ c·F (x), where F is the multilinear extension of f . Moreover, even if f is not monotone,
E[f(R(1/2 · 1S))] ≥ (c/4) · F (x), where the random decisions used to calculate R(1/2 · 1S) are considered
part of the algorithm, and thus, known to the almighty adversary.
In many applications the use of Theorem 1.10 requires finding offline, using the available a priori infor-
mation, a vector x (approximately) maximizing the multilinear extension F . This can often be done using
known algorithms. For example, Ca˘linescu et al. [7] proved that given a non-negative monotone submodular
function f : 2N → R≥0 and a solvable7 polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]N , one can efficiently find a fractional point
x ∈ P for which F (x) ≥ (1 − e−1) · max{f(S) | 1S ∈ P}. Chekuri et al. [10] showed that even when
f is not monotone, an analogous result can be obtained with a worse constant factor of 0.325 instead of
1− e−1 when P is solvable and down-closed. A simpler procedure with a stronger constant factor was later
presented by Feldman et al. [14], implying that one can efficiently find a fractional point x ∈ P for which
F (x) ≥ (e−1 − o(1)) ·max{f(S) | 1S ∈ P} as long as the polytope P is solvable and down-closed.
The result of Theorem 1.10 for a non-monotone submodular objective can sometimes be improved when
assuming an online adversary (instead of an almighty one). The class of OCRSs for which this can be done
is a bit involved to define, and we defer its definition to Section 3. We state here only the following special
case of the result we prove.
Theorem 1.11. Let π be a (b, c)-selectable greedy OCRS π for a polytope P that was obtained by using
Theorem 1.9 to combine the OCRS of Theorem 1.8. Then, for every given non-negative submodular function
f : 2N → R≥0 there exists an OCRS π′ for P that for every input vector x ∈ bP and online adversary
selects a random set S such that E[f(S))] ≥ c · F (x).
The OCRS π′ guaranteed by Theorem 1.11 is not efficient. However, if π is efficient then π′ can be
made efficient at the cost of an additive loss of |N |−d ·max{f({e}) | xe > 0} in the guarantee (where d is
any positive constant).
1.3 Applications
In this section we present a few applications for our technical results. All these applications were previously
studied in the literature, and connections have been found between them. In this work we show that all three
applications can be reduced to finding appropriate OCRSs. In addition to proving new results, we believe
that these reductions into one common setting clarify the connections between the three applications.
5A set function f : 2N → R is submodular if f(A) + f(B) ≥ f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B) for every two sets A,B ⊆ N .
6A set function f : 2N → R is monotone if f(A) ≤ f(B) for every two sets A ⊆ B ⊆ N .
7A polytope is solvable if one can optimize linear functions over it.
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Prophet inequalities for Bayesian online selection problems
Consider again the Bayesian online selection problem we sketched earlier in the introduction. We recall
that the setting in this problem consists of a matroid M = (N,F) and independent non-negative ran-
dom variables Ze for every e ∈ N with known distributions. Moreover, the random variables Ze satisfy
maxe∈N E[Ze] < ∞. An offline adversary chooses upfront the order in which the elements e ∈ N reveal
a realization ze of Ze. The task is to select online an independent set of elements I ∈ F with total weight
z(I) =
∑
e∈I ze as high as possible.
A fundamental result about the relative power of offline and online algorithms in a Bayesian setting
was obtained by Krengel, Sucheston and Garling (see [19]) for the special case when M is the uniform
matroid of rank one, i.e., precisely one element can be selected. They showed that there exists a selection
algorithm returning a single element of expected weight as least 12E[maxe∈N Ze], i.e., half of the weight of
the best offline solution, which is the best solution obtainable by an algorithm that knows all realizations
upfront. Recently, Kleinberg and Weinberg [18] extended this result considerably by showing that the same
guarantee can be obtained when selecting multiple elements that have to be independent in the matroid M ,
i.e., there exists an online algorithm returning a set I ∈ F satisfying
E
[∑
e∈I
Ze
]
≥
1
2
E
[
max
{∑
e∈S
Ze
∣∣∣∣∣ S ∈ F
}]
. (1)
Inequalities of type (1) are often called prophet inequalities due to the interpretation of the offline adversary
as a prophet. Moreover, Kleinberg and Weinberg generalized their result to the setting where F are the
common independent sets in the intersection of p matroids. For this setting, they present an online algorithm
whose expected profit is at least 14p−2 times the expected maximum weight of a feasible set. Kleinberg and
Weinberg’s algorithms work not just against an offline adversary, which is the adversary type typically
assumed in Bayesian online selection, but also against an online adversary.
Using a simple, yet very general link between greedy OCRSs and prophet inequalities we can generate
prophet inequalities from greedy OCRSs.
Theorem 1.12. Let F ⊆ 2N be a down-closed set family and P be a relaxation of F . If there exists a
c-selectable greedy OCRS for P then there is an online algorithm for the Bayesian online selection problem
with almighty adversary that returns a set I ∈ F satisfying
E
[∑
e∈I
Ze
]
≥ c · E
[
max
{∑
e∈S
Ze
∣∣∣∣∣ S ∈ F
}]
.
As we discuss in Section 4, the above theorem can be made constructive in many cases, assuming that
the OCRS is efficient and some natural optimization problems involving the distributions of the random
weights Ze can be solved efficiently.
Our results show that constant-factor prophet inequalities are often possible even against an almighty
adversary. Moreover, we get Θ(1)-factor prophet inequalities for a wide set of new constraint families.
Corollary 1.13. There are Θ(1)-factor prophet inequalities for the Bayesian online selection problem
against the almighty adversary for any constraint family that is an intersection of a constant number of
matroid, knapsack, and matching constraints.
In contrast, so far, the most general prophet inequality was the 14p−2 -factor prophet inequality of Klein-
berg and Weinberg for the intersection of p matroids. Interestingly, even for this specific setting of the
intersection of p matroids, considered by Kleinberg and Weinberg, our general approach allows for obtain-
ing a better constant for p ≥ 4 (against a stronger adversary).
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Corollary 1.14. There is an 1
e(p+1) -factor prophet inequality for the Bayesian online selection problem
against the almighty adversary when the feasible sets are described by the intersection of p matroids.
That our results hold against an almighty adversary is in particular of importance for applications of
prophet inequalities to posted pricing mechanisms. Indeed, one of the main technical difficulties that Klein-
berg and Weinberg [18] had to overcome to apply their results to posted pricing mechanism, was the fact
that their results were only with respect to an online adversary.
Oblivious posted pricing mechanisms
We start by introducing the Bayesian single-parameter mechanism design setting (short BSMD), largely
following [8]. There is a single seller providing a set N of services, and for each service e ∈ N there
is one agent interested in e, whose valuation is drawn from a nonnegative random variable Ze. The Ze are
independent and have known distributions. Furthermore, there is a down-closed familyF ⊆ 2N representing
feasibility constraints faced by the seller, i.e., the seller can provide any set of services S ∈ F . The setting
is called single-parameter because every agent is interested in precisely one service. The goal in this setting
is to find truthful mechanisms maximizing the expected revenue.
From a theoretical point of view, this setting is well understood and optimally solved by Myersons’s
mechanism [22]. Unfortunately, the resulting mechanism is impractical, and thus, rarely employed. Fur-
thermore, it does not extend to multi-parameter settings where an agent may, for example, be interested in
buying one out of several items, a setting known as Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand mechanism de-
sign (BMUMD). Therefore, Chawla et al. [8] suggested considerably simpler and more robust alternatives
having many advantages while maintaining an almost optimal performance [8, 24, 18]. The idea is to offer
to the agents sequentially take-it-or-leave-it prices as follows. Agents are considered one by one, in an order
chosen by the algorithm. Whenever an agent e ∈ N is considered, the algorithm either makes no offer to
e—and thus e does not get served—or, if e can be added to the elements selected so far without violating
feasibility, an offer pe ∈ R≥0 is made to e. Agent e will then accept the offer if Ze ≥ pe and decline if
Ze < pe.
This type of mechanism, with the additional freedom that the algorithm can choose the order in which
to consider the agents, is called a sequential posted price mechanism. A natural stronger version of sequen-
tial posted price mechanisms, called constrained oblivious posted price mechanisms (COPM), suggested by
Chawla et al. [8], allows for dealing with the multi-parameter setting BMUMD, and has many further inter-
esting properties. Formally, a COPM is defined by a tuple (p ∈ RE≥0,F ′), where p are the take-it-or-leave-it
prices, and F ′ ⊆ F . A COPM defined by (p,F ′) works as follows. Consider the moment when a new agent
e arrives and let S be the set of agents served so far. If S ∪ {e} 6∈ F ′, then e is skipped; otherwise, e is of-
fered the price pe. In short the COPM maintains a feasible set in the more restricted family F ′, and greedily
selects any agent e that does not destroy feasibility in F ′ and has a valuation of at least pe. Furthermore, the
order of the agents is chosen by an adversary at the beginning of the procedure, knowing all valuations ze,
the prices pe and the family F ′. A COPM can also be randomized, in which case the tuple (p,F ′) is chosen
at random at the beginning of the algorithm.
So far, COPMs with an O(1) gap with respect to the optimal mechanism were only known for very
restricted types of matroids, and the intersection of two partition matroids [8]. For general matroids, the best
previously known COPM was a non-efficient procedure with an optimality gap of O(log(rank)), where
rank is the size of a largest feasible set of the matroid [8]. In particular, the existence of an COPM for
general matroids with constant optimality gap remained an open problem.
Exploiting a link between greedy OCRSs and COPMs, we resolve the open question about O(1)-optimal
COPMs for matroids raised in [8], and show that even much more general constraint families admit O(1)-
optimal COPMs.
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Theorem 1.15. Let F ⊆ 2N be a down-closed family and P be a relaxation of F . If there is a c-selectable
greedy OCRS for P , then there is a COPM for F that, even against an almighty adversary, is at most a
factor of c worse than the optimal truthful mechanism.
Using the reduction from the multi-parameter setting to the single-parameter setting presented in [8] we
obtain results for BMUMD under very general feasibility constraints.
Corollary 1.16. Let F be the intersection of a constant number of matroid, knapsack, and matching con-
straints. Then there is a posted price mechanism for BMUMD on F whose optimality gap with respect to
the optimal truthful mechanism is at most a constant.
Moreover, as we highlight in Section 4, the mechanisms obtained through our greedy OCRSs can be
implemented efficiently under mild assumptions.
Stochastic probing
Recently, Gupta and Nagarajan [17] introduced the following stochastic probing model. Given is a finite
ground set N and each element e ∈ N is active with a given probability pe ∈ [0, 1], independently of
the other elements. Furthermore, there is a weight function w : N → Z, and two down-closed constraint
families Fin,Fout ⊆ 2N on N , which are called the inner and outer constraints, respectively. The goal is to
select a subset of active elements of high weight according to the following rules. An algorithm must first
probe an element e ∈ N to select it. If a probed element e is active, then e is selected, otherwise it is not.
The algorithm can choose the order in which elements are probed. The set Q of all probed elements must
satisfy Q ∈ Fout and the set S ⊆ Q of all selected elements must satisfy S ∈ Fin. Hence, at any step of the
algorithm an element can only be probed if adding it to the currently probed elements does not violate Fout,
and adding it to the elements selected so far does not violate Fin. Gupta and Nagarajan [17] showed that this
model captures numerous applications. Furthermore, they show how so-called ordered CRSs can be used to
get approximately optimal approximation factors for many constraint families including the intersection of a
constant number of matroids. However, due to their use of ordered CRSs, the presented algorithms crucially
rely on the fact that the order in which elements are probed can be chosen freely.
Replacing their use of ordered CRSs with OCRSs we can drop this requirement.
Theorem 1.17. Let Fin,Fout ⊆ 2N be two down-closed families. If there are a (b, cin)-selectable greedy
OCRS πin for a relaxation Pin of Fin and a (b, cout)-selectable greedy OCRS πout for a relaxation Pout
of Fout, then there is a (b · cin · cout)-approximation for the weighted stochastic probing problem where
the order in which elements can be probed is chosen by an almighty adversary and the inner and outer
constraints are given by Fin and Fout, respectively.8 Moreover, if πin and πout are efficient and there are
separation oracles for Pin and Pout, then the above algorithm has a polynomial time complexity.
It turns out that the extension to arbitrary probing orders resolves an open question of [17] about stochas-
tic probing with deadline. In a probing problem with deadlines there is a deadline de ∈ Z≥1 for each element
e ∈ N , indicating that e can only be probed as one of the first de elements that get probed. Using a clever
technique, Gupta and Nagarajan [17] presented an O(1)-approximation for this problem setting for the un-
weighted case, i.e., w is the all-ones vector, when Fin,Fout are k-systems9, for k = O(1). They left it as
an open question how to approach the weighted version of stochastic probing with deadlines. Using OCRSs
8Similar to [17] one can strengthen the theorem, and only assume an offline CRS for Fout and an OCRS for Fin. The fact that
an offline CRS suffices for Fout can sometimes be used to get better approximation factors. For simplicity of presentation, we do
not go into these details here, and also in Theorem 1.18 and 1.19.
9A k-system F ⊆ 2N is a down-closed family such that, for any S ⊆ N , the ratio of the sizes of any two maximal sets of F
that are contained in S is at most k. In particular, k-systems generalize the intersection of k matroids.
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we can leverage Theorem 1.17 to consider elements in increasing order of their deadlines, which allows for
addressing this open question.
Theorem 1.18. Let Fin,Fout ⊆ 2N be two down-closed families. If there are a (b, cin)-selectable greedy
OCRS πin for a relaxation Pin of Fin and a (b, cout)-selectable greedy OCRS πout for a relaxation Pout of
Fout, then there is a (b(1− b) · cin · cout)-approximation for the weighted stochastic probing with deadlines
problem where the inner and outer constraints are given by Fin and Fout, respectively. Moreover, if πin
and πout are efficient and there are separation oracles for Pin and Pout, then the above algorithm has a
polynomial time complexity.
We highlight that the stochastic probing problem with monotone submodular objectives but without
deadlines—in short, submodular stochastic probing—was considered by Adamczyk et al. [1], who presented
for this setting a (1 − 1/e)/(kin + kout + 1)-approximation when Fin and Fout are the intersection of kin
and kout matroids, respectively. Using our techniques we obtain O(1)-approximations for considerably
more general settings of submodular stochastic probing. More precisely, we can handle a very broad set
of constraints, with a probing order chosen by an almighty adversary (instead of being choosable by the
algorithm).
Theorem 1.19. Let Fin,Fout ⊆ 2N be two down-closed families. If there are a (b, cin)-selectable greedy
OCRS πin for a relaxation Pin of Fin and a (b, cout)-selectable greedy OCRS πout for a relaxation Pout of
Fout, then there is a ((1 − e−b − o(1)) · cin · cout)-approximation for the submodular stochastic probing
problem where the order in which elements can be probed is chosen by an almighty adversary and the inner
and outer constraints are given by Fin and Fout, respectively. Moreover, if πin and πout are efficient and
there are separation oracles for Pin and Pout, then the above algorithm has a polynomial time complexity.
We remark that the same idea used to derive Theorem 1.18 from Theorem 1.17 can also be used to derive
from Theorem 1.19 a result for the submodular stochastic probing with deadlines problem.
2 Constructing Online Contention Resolution Schemes
In this section we prove the existence (or non-existence) of OCRSs for various polytopes. Sections 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3 study OCRSs for matroid polytopes, matching polytopes and the natural relaxation of knapsack
constraints, respectively. The results proved in these sections prove together Theorem 1.8. Theorem 1.9,
which shows that greedy OCRSs for different polytopes can be combined to create greedy OCRSs for the
intersection of these polytopes, is proved in Section 2.4.
2.1 OCRS for matroids
In this section we give a greedy OCRS for matroid polytopes. For standard matroidal concepts such as span,
rank, contraction and restriction, we refer the reader to Appendix A. Also recall that, for a given matroid
M = (N,F), the matroid polytope PF is defined by {x ∈ RN≥0 | ∀S ⊆ N
∑
e∈S xe ≤ rank(S)}. The
main result of this section can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2.1. Let b ∈ [0, 1]. There exists a (b, 1− b)-selectable deterministic greedy OCRS for any matroid
polytope PF ⊆ [0, 1]N on ground set N .
Combining Theorem 1.9 with Theorem 2.1, we also get a greedy OCRS for the intersection of k ma-
troids.
Corollary 2.2. Let b ∈ [0, 1], and let P1, . . . , Pk ⊆ [0, 1]N be k matroid polytopes over a common ground
set N . Then there exists a (b, (1 − b)k)-selectable deterministic greedy OCRS for P = ∩ki=1Pi.
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Note that the above corollary implies (by Observation 1.6) that there is a b(1 − b)k-selectable greedy
OCRS for P . Moreover, choosing b = 11+k in Corollary 2.2, we obtain the following.
Corollary 2.3. Let P1, . . . , Pk ⊆ [0, 1]N be matroid polytopes over a common ground set N , let P =
∩ki=1Pi, and let c = 1k+1(1−
1
1+k )
k ≥ 1
e(k+1) . Then there exists a c-selectable greedy OCRS for P .
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.1. Consider a matroid M = (N,F) and let
PF be the associated polytope. Our greedy OCRS is based on using x ∈ PF to find a chain decomposition
of the elements
∅ = Nℓ ( Nℓ−1 ( · · · ( N1 ( N0 = N .
It then accepts an active element e ∈ Ni \Ni+1 if e together with the already accepted elements in Ni \Ni+1
forms an independent set in the matroid (M/Ni+1)|Ni , i.e., the matroid obtained from M by contracting
Ni+1 and then restricting to Ni. To see that this OCRS is a greedy OCRS, note that the above algorithm is
equivalent to defining the family Fx = {I ⊆ N : ∀i I ∩ (Ni \Ni+1) is independent in (M/Ni+1)|Ni}. The
family Fx is clearly a down-closed family of sets (since each (M/Ni+1)|Ni is a matroid and its independent
sets are, thus, down-closed). Moreover, Fx is a subset of feasible sets because (see, e.g., Theorem 5.1
in [23]) if Ii is an independent set of (M/Ni+1)|Ni for every i, then the set ∪iIi is independent in M .
Even though we do not need this fact, we highlight that Fx itself describes a family of independent sets of
a matroid. This follows from the fact that Fx is the family of all (disjoint) unions of independent sets in
the matroids (M/Ni+1)|Ni for i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1}, implying that Fx are the independent sets of the union
matroid obtained by taking the union of all matroids (M/Ni+1)|Ni for i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ− 1}.
Having shown that the above algorithm is a greedy OCRS for any chain decomposition of the elements,
we turn our attention to the task of defining a chain that maximizes the selectability of our greedy OCRS.
For a fixed chain, we have that the selectability of an element e ∈ Ni \Ni+1 is
Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fx ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fx] = Pr[e 6∈ spani ((R(x) ∩ (Ni \Ni+1)) \ {e})] ,
where spani(·) denotes the span function of matroid (M/Ni+1)|Ni . Our objective is therefore to construct
a chain decomposition that maximizes Pr[e 6∈ spani ((R(x) ∩ (Ni \Ni+1)) \ {e})] or equivalently mini-
mizes
Pr[e ∈ spani ((R(x) ∩ (Ni \Ni+1)) \ {e})] . (2)
We now describe an iterative procedure for constructing a chain decomposition so that (2) is at most b
for each element. Initially, the chain only consists of the ground set N0 = N . We need to refine the chain if
there exists an element e ∈ N such that Pr[e ∈ span(R(x) \ {e})] > b. We do that in a “minimal” way as
follows:
• Let S = ∅.
• While there exists e ∈ N0 \ S such that Pr[e ∈ span ((R(x) ∪ S) \ {e})] > b, add e to S.
We then let N1 = S. Note that if N1 is a strict subset of N0 then we have made progress and we repeat
the above procedure (on the matroid induced by N1) to obtain N2 ( N1, and so on, until we obtain Nℓ = ∅.
Thus, if we assume that the procedure terminates, then, by construction, the chain satisfies
Pr[spani ((R(x) ∩ (Ni \Ni+1)) \ {e})] ≤ b for all i and e ∈ Ni \Ni+1 .
The rest of this section is devoted to show that the chain construction always terminates. As described
above, this implies a (b, 1 − b)-selectable greedy OCRS, and thus proves Theorem 2.1.
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2.1.1 Proof of termination of chain construction
To prove that the chain decomposition terminates, it is sufficient to show that N1 = S ( N0 = N for any
(non-empty) matroid as the chain decomposition then recurses on the matroid induced by N1 (so the same
argument implies that N2 ( N1 assuming N1 6= ∅, and so on). Notice that the definition of S implies that
S can only increase as coordinates of x are increased. Hence, it is safe to assume that x ∈ b · PB, where
PB = {x ∈ PF | x(N) = rank(N)} is the base polytope of the matroid M , which is the set of all maximal
vectors in PF .
For proofs in the rest of the section it will be convenient to have the following equivalent view of the
construction of S = N1 in the refinement procedure.
• Let S0 = ∅, and let S1 = {e ∈ N | Pr[e ∈ span (R(x) \ {e})] > b} be the set of elements that are
“likely” to be spanned.
• Assuming we have defined S0, S1, . . . , Si−1, let
Si = {e ∈ N | Pr[e ∈ span ((R(x) ∪ Si−1) \ {e})] > b} ,
that is, Si contains those elements that are likely to be spanned assuming that the elements of Si−1
are contracted (or equivalently appear with probability 1).
Notice that Si−1 ⊆ Si for every i ≥ 1, and Si = Si−1 implies Si = Sj for every j > i. Thus, we must have
N1 = S = S|N |. The key technical part of the termination analysis is the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. It always holds that:∑
e∈N
xe Pr[e ∈ span (R(x) ∪ S)] ≤ b · (x(N) + (1− b) rank(S)) .
Moreover, the inequality is strict if S 6= ∅.
Before proving the lemma, let us see that it implies what we want:
Corollary 2.5. If N 6= ∅ then N1 = S ( N .
Proof. The corollary is clearly true if S = ∅. Otherwise, by Lemma 2.4,
x(S) ≤ x(span (R(x) ∪ S)) =
∑
e∈N
xe Pr[e ∈ span (R(x) ∪ S)]
< b(x(N) + (1− b) rank(S)) ≤ b rank(N) .
As x(S) < b · rank(N) and x(N) = b · rank(N) by our assumption that x ∈ bPB , we get x(S) < x(N),
which implies N \ S 6= ∅.
Let us now continue with the proof of the our technical lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Let S′ = {e1, e2, . . . , ek} be a basis of the matroid M |S obtained by first greedily
selecting elements from S0, then greedily adding elements from S1, and so on. Consider the distribution µ
over 2N defined according to the following sampling procedure:
1. Let A be a random set originally distributed like R(x).
2. For j = 1, 2, . . . , k, if ej 6∈ span(A), add ej to A.
3. Output A.
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Observe that this sampling procedure guarantees that the distributions of span(S ∪R(x)), span(S′∪R(x))
and span(A) are identical. Therefore,
Pr[e ∈ span (R(x) ∪ S)] = PrA∼µ[e ∈ span(A)] .
Now simple calculations yield∑
e∈NxePrA∼µ[e ∈ span(A)] = EA∼µ[x(span(A))]
≤ b · EA∼µ[rank(span(A))] (using x ∈ b · PI )
= b · EA∼µ[rank(A)] ≤ b · EA∼µ[|A|] .
We complete the proof by showing that EA∼µ[|A|] ≤ x(N) + (1− b) rank(S). To see this, note that
EA∼µ[|A|] = x(N) +
k∑
j=1
Pr[ej 6∈ span(R(x) ∪ {e1, . . . , ej−1})]
≤ x(N) + (1− b)k = x(N) + (1− b) · rank(S) ,
where the inequality follows from the following argument. If we let i be the smallest index so that ej ∈ Si,
then by the construction of S′ we have Pr[ej ∈ span(R(x) ∪ {e1, . . . , ej−1})] ≥ Pr[ej ∈ span(R(x) ∪
Si−1)] > b. Finally, we remark that the strict inequality Pr[ej ∈ span(R(x) ∪ Si−1)] > b implies that the
inequality in the statement is strict if S 6= ∅.
Efficient implementation
The only step that is not constructive in the description of our OCRS for matroids is the computation of
probabilities of the type Pr[e ∈ span((R(x) ∪ Si−1) \ {e})]. One can easily get around this issue by using
good estimates through Monte-Carlo sampling, leading to the following.
Lemma 2.6. For any ǫ > 0 and α > 0, there is a randomized construction of a chain ∅ = Nℓ ( Nℓ−1 (
. . . ( N1 ( N0 = N such that with probability at least 1 − |N |−α the greedy OCRS defined by the chain
is (b, 1− b− ǫ)-selectable. Furthermore, the time needed for this construction is O(α · 1
ǫ2
· poly(|N |) · T ),
where T is the time for a single call to the independence oracle of the matroid, and we assume that we can
sample a Bernoulli random variable in O(1) time.
Proof. For simplicity we define pe,S = Pr[e ∈ span((R(x) ∪ S) \ {e})] for e ∈ N and S ⊆ N . As before,
we focus on the construction of N1; the algorithm is then applied recursively. We recall that in the above-
mentioned construction we set N1 = S, where S was constructed from S = ∅ by adding elements e ∈ N
satisfying pe,S > b. To perform this step constructively we will, whenever we need a probability pe,S , use an
estimate pˆe,S obtained through Monte-Carlo sampling. By standard results on Monte-Carlo sampling (see,
e.g., [11]) it suffices to use O(α · 1
ǫ2
· log |N |) many samples to obtain a value pˆe,S such that
Pr [pˆe,S ∈ [pe,S − ǫ, pe,S]] ≥ 1− |N |
−3−α .
Hence, to construct S, we start with S = ∅ and successively add elements e ∈ N \ S with pˆe,S > b. There
are at most |N | elements we add to S, and to add one element to S we may have to check the values pˆe,S
of all elements in N \ S. Hence, to construct S we use at most O(|N |2) estimates of the type pˆe,S . At
the end of this procedure we set N1 = S and repeat. Since there are at most O(|N |) sets in the final chain
∅ = Nℓ ( . . . ( N0 = N , the total number of estimates we need is bounded by O(|N |3), which implies
the claimed running time of our algorithm. Moreover, with probability at least 1− |N |−α, all our estimates
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pˆe,S satisfy pˆe,S ∈ [pe,S − ǫ, pe,S ]. To prove the lemma, we assume from now on that all our estimates fulfil
this property and show that this implies that the OCRS we obtain is (b, 1− b− ǫ)-selectable.
Notice that during our construction of S we only add elements e to S satisfying b < pˆe,S ≤ pe,S . Hence,
the elements we add would also have been added to S in the construction that uses the true probabilities
pe,S . Therefore, for the same reasons showing that S ( N when using the true probabilities pe,S , we also
have S ( N . It remains to observe that at the end of the construction of S, i.e., when we set N1 = S, the
probability 1− pe,S = Pr[e 6∈ span((S ∪R(x)) \ {e})] of an element e ∈ N \S being selectable is at least
1− b− ǫ. This indeed holds since
1− pe,S ≥ 1− pˆe,S − ǫ ≥ 1− b− ǫ .
2.2 OCRSs for matchings in general graphs
In this section we describe an OCRS that works for a relaxation PG of matching in a general graph G =
(V,E). Specifically, the relaxation polytope PG is defined as:∑
g∈δ(u) xg ≤ 1 ∀ u ∈ V
xg ≥ 0 ∀ g ∈ E ,
where δ(u) is the set of edges incident to the node u. Observe that this relaxation is weaker than the matching
polytope, hence, our results hold also for the matching polytope. We would like to stress that the ground set
in this section is the set of edges, and thus, unlike in the rest of the paper, we denote it by E. Some ideas
from the proof of Theorem 2.7 can be traced to offline CRSs given by [14].10
Theorem 2.7. For every b ∈ [0, 1], there exists a (b, e−2b)-selectable randomized greedy OCRS for the
relaxation PG ⊆ [0, 1]E of matching in a graph G = (V,E).
Proof. Let x ∈ bPG be the input point to the OCRS, and let A ∼ R(x) be the set of active elements.
Our OCRS begins by selecting a subset K of potential edges, where every edge g ∈ E belongs to K with
probability (1 − e−xg)/xg , independently (observe that this probability in indeed always within the range
[0, 1]). Whenever an edge g reveals whether it is active, the OCRS selects it if g ∈ A ∩K and the addition
of g to the set of already selected edges does not make this set an illegal matching. Observe that for any
fixed choice of K this OCRS is a deterministic greedy OCRS, and thus, for a random K it is a randomized
greedy OCRS.
Next, let us show that our OCRS is (b, e−2b)-selectable. Consider an arbitrary edge g′ = uv ∈ E. We
need to prove that with probability at least e−2b the edge g′ is in K , and can be added to any matching which
is a subset of A ∩K . Formally, we need to prove:
Pr[g′ ∈ K,A ∩K ∩ (δ(u) ∪ δ(v) \ {g′}) = ∅] ≥ e−2b .
Clearly, every edge g ∈ E belongs to A ∩ K with probability xg · (1 − e−xg)/xg = 1 − e−xg . Since the
membership of every edge in K and A is independent from the membership of other edges in these sets, we
get:
Pr[g′ ∈ K,A ∩K ∩ (δ(u) ∪ δ(v) \ {g′}) = ∅] = Pr[g′ ∈ K] ·
∏
g∈δ(u)∪δ(v)\{g′}
Pr[g 6∈ A ∩K]
=
(1− e−xg′ )
xg′
·
∏
g∈δ(u)∪δ(v)\{g′}
e−xg =
(1− e−xg′ )
xg′
· e−
∑
g∈δ(u)∪δ(v)\{g′} xg
≥
(1− e−xg′ )
xg′
· e−2(b−xg′ ) =
exg′ (exg′ − 1)
xg′
· e−2b ≥ e−2b ,
10The details of these CRSs are omitted in [14], but can be found in [13].
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where the first inequality holds since the membership of x in bPG guarantees that the total x-values of the
edges in δ(u) \ {g′} (or δ(v) \ {g′}) is at most b− xg′ .
Remark: If one is interested in a deterministic greedy OCRS, it is possible to set K equal to E determin-
istically in the greedy OCRS described by the last proof. A simple modification of the proof shows that the
resulting deterministic greedy OCRS is (b, (1 − b)2)-selectable.
2.3 OCRSs for knapsack constraint
In this section we consider the problem of defining an OCRS for a polytope P ⊆ [0, 1]N defined by a single
knapsack constraint. That is, each element e ∈ N has an associated size se ∈ [0, 1] and P is defined by∑
e∈N sexe ≤ 1
xe ∈ [0, 1] for e ∈ N .
We begin with an interesting simple observation.
Proposition 2.8. For every n ≥ 1, there exists a knapsack constraint over a ground set of n elements such
that no deterministic greedy OCRS for the polytope defined by this constraint is (b, c)-selectable for any pair
of b ∈ [0, 1] and c > (1− b)n−1.
Proof. Consider the knapsack constraint defined by the ground set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and sizes s1 = s2 =
· · · = sn−1 = 1/n, sn = 1. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a deterministic greedy OCRS
that is (b, c)-selectable for some b ∈ [0, 1] and c > (1 − b)n−1, and consider the family Fx of feasible sets
used by this OCRS for the possible input x1 = x2 = · · · = xn−1 = b, xn = b/n.
Since the OCRS is (b, c)-selectable for c > 0, each element e ∈ N must be included in at least one set
of the family Fx. Thus, by the down-monotonicity of Fx it must contain the set {e} for every e ∈ N . On
the other hand, for every e ∈ N \{n} we have {e, n} 6∈ F , and thus, also {e, n} 6∈ Fx. Combining all these
observations, we get:
Pr[I ∪ {n} ∈ Fx ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fx] ≤ Pr[e 6∈ R(x) ∀ e ∈ N \ {n}] = (1− b)
n−1 < c ,
which contradicts the (b, c)-selectability of the assumed OCRS.
The next theorem shows that randomized greedy OCRSs can do much better. Some of the ideas used by
this theorem can be traced back to an offline CRS presented by [10] for knapsack constraints.
Theorem 2.9. For every b ∈ [0, 1/2], there exists a
(
b, 1−2b2−2b
)
-selectable randomized greedy OCRS for any
polytope P defined by a knapsack constraint.
Proof. Let x ∈ bP be the input point to the OCRS, and let Nbig = {e ∈ N | se > 1/2} be the subset of
elements that are big. We use bbig to denote the total part of the knapsack occupied by big elements in the
fractional solution x. Formally,
bbig =
∑
e∈Nbig
sexe .
Observe that bbig is always within the range [0, b]. The randomized greedy OCRS we use is defined as
follows. With probability pbig accept greedily the elements of Nbig while respecting the knapsack inequality,
where pbig is the probability
pbig =
1− 2b+ 2bbig
2− 2b
.
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With the remaining probability accept greedily the small elements of N \Nbig while respecting the knapsack
inequality. It is easy to see that this OCRS is indeed a randomized greedy OCRS.
We continue to analyze the selectability of the above OCRS. Observe that for any big element e′ ∈ Nbig:
Pr[I ∪ {e′} ∈ Fx ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fx] ≥ Pr
[
{e′} ∈ Fx,
∑
e∈R(x)∩Nbig
se ≤ 1− se′
]
. (3)
The event {e′} ∈ Fx is simply the event that the OCRS decides to accept big elements. Given that this event
occurs, the condition
∑
e∈R(x)∩Nbig
se ≤ 1− se′ guarantees that for every subset I of R(x) ∩Nbig one can
add the element e′ without violating the knapsack constraint. We can lower bound (3) as follows.
Pr
[
{e′} ∈ Fx,
∑
e∈R(x)∩Nbig
se ≤ 1− se′
]
= pbig · Pr[R(x) ∩ (Nbig \ {e
′}) = ∅]
≥
1− 2b+ 2bbig
2− 2b
· (1− x(Nbig)) ≥
1− 2b+ 2bbig
2− 2b
· (1− 2bbig) ≥
1− 2b
2− 2b
,
where the first inequality follows from the union bound and the second inequality uses the fact that se > 1/2
for every e ∈ Nbig. Similarly, for an element e 6∈ Nbig we have:
Pr[I ∪ {e′} ∈ Fx ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fx] ≥ Pr
[
{e′} ∈ Fx,
∑
e∈R(x)\Nbig
se ≤ 1− se′
]
≥ (1− pbig) · Pr[s(R(x) \ (Nbig ∪ {e
′})) ≤ 1/2] ≥
(
1−
1− 2b+ 2bbig
2− 2b
)
·
(
1−
b− bbig
1/2
)
=
1− 2bbig
2− 2b
· (1− 2b+ 2bbig) ≥
1− 2b
2− 2b
,
where the third inequality follows from Markov’s inequality.
2.4 Combining constraints
Like offline CRSs (see [10]), greedy OCRSs can be combined to form greedy OCRSs for more involved
constraints.
Definition 2.10. Given two greedy OCRSs π1 and π2 for polytopes P1 and P2, the combination of π1 and π2
is a greedy OCRS π for the polytope P = P1 ∩ P2. For every input x ∈ P , π is defined by the down-closed
family Fπ,x = Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x.
Theorem 1.9 is an immediate implication of the next lemma.
Lemma 2.11. Let π1 and π2 be (b, c1)-selectable and (b, c2)-selectable greedy OCRSs, respectively. The
combination of π1 and π2 is (b, c1 · c2)-selectable.
Proof. Let P1 and P2 be the polytopes of π1 and π2, respectively. Additionally, let x ∈ b(P1 ∩ P2), and let
e be an arbitrary element of N . We need to prove that:
Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x] ≥ c1 · c2 .
For ease of notation, let us denote by χe(A,F ,F ′) an indicator for the event that I ∪ {e} ∈ F for ev-
ery set I ⊆ A obeying I ∈ F ′. Using this notation, the inequality that we need to prove becomes:
Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)] ≥ c1 · c2.
On the other hand, observe that x ∈ b(P1 ∩ P2) ⊆ bP1. Hence, the (b, c1)-selectability of π1 implies
that:
Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ1,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)] ≥ Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ1,x,Fπ1,x)]
= Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ1,x ∀ I ⊆ R(x), I ∈ Fπ1,x] ≥ c1 .
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where the first inequality follows since χe is a non-increasing function of its third argument (when the other
two arguments are fixed). Similarly, we also get: Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ2,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)] ≥ c2. Next, observe
that χe is also non-increasing in its first argument (when the other two arguments are fixed). Hence, if we
let R be a random set distributed like R(x), then, by the FKG inequality:
Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)]
= Pr[χe(R,Fπ1,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x) · χe(R,Fπ2,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)]
≥ Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ1,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)] · Pr[χe(R(x),Fπ2,x,Fπ1,x ∩ Fπ2,x)] ≥ c1 · c2 .
3 From Selectability to Approximation
In this section we prove Theorems 1.10 and 1.11 which study the relation between the value of a vector
x and the the expected value of the output produced by an OCRS given this vector as input. Following
is a restatement of Theorem 1.10. Unlike the original statement of the theorem, this restatement uses the
notation S(p), where S is a set and p is a probability, to denote a random set containing every element e ∈ S
with probability p, independently. Observe that S(p) has the same distribution as R(p · 1S).
Theorem 1.10. Given a non-negative monotone submodular function f : 2N → R≥0 and a (b, c)-selectable
greedy OCRS for a polytope P , applying the greedy OCRS to an input x ∈ bP results in a random set S
satisfying E[f(S)] ≥ c·F (x), where F is the multilinear extension of f . Moreover, even if f is not monotone,
E[f(S(1/2))] ≥ (c/4) · F (x), where the random decisions used to calculate S(1/2) are considered part of
the algorithm, and thus, known to the almighty adversary.
To prove Theorem 1.10 we need to define some concepts regarding offline CRSs. Recall that a CRS for
a polytope P is a (possibly random) function π : 2N → 2N that depends on an input vector x ∈ P , and for
every set S ⊆ N returns a subset π(S) ⊆ S that obeys the polytope P (i.e., 1π(S) ∈ P ).
Definition 3.1. A CRS π for a polytope P is:
• (b, c)-balanced some for b, c ∈ [0, 1] if Pr[e ∈ π(R(x)) | e ∈ R(x)] ≥ c · xe whenever the input
vector x belongs to bP and xe > 0.
• monotone if Pr[e ∈ π(S1)] ≥ Pr[e ∈ π(S2)] whenever e ∈ S1 ⊆ S2.
We now define and analyze an interesting notion that allows us to connect the world of OCRSs with that
of CRSs.
Definition 3.2 (characteristic CRS). The characteristic CRS π¯ of a greedy OCRS π for a polytope P is a
CRS for the same polytope P . It is defined for an input x ∈ P and a set A ⊆ N by π¯(A) = {e ∈ A |
I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ,x ∀I ⊆ A, I ∈ Fπ,x}.
The following observation shows that π¯(A) obeys the polytope P and π¯(A) ⊆ A. Thus, the character-
istic CRS π¯ is a true CRS for the polytope P .
Observation 3.3. For every set A ⊆ N and a characteristic CRS π¯ of a greedy OCRS π, the set π¯(A) is
always a subset of the elements selected by π when the active elements are the elements of A.
Proof. Fix an element e ∈ π¯(A), and let T be the set of elements selected by the greedy OCRS π imme-
diately before e reveals whether it is active. The definition of π¯(A) guarantees that T ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ,x since
T ∈ Fπ,x, and thus, e is accepted by π.
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Lemma 3.4. The characteristic CRS π¯ of a (b, c)-selectable greedy OCRS π is (b, c)-balanced and mono-
tone.
Proof. Let P denote the polytope of the greedy OCRS π (and its characteristic CRS π¯), and fix a vector
x ∈ bP . Since π is (b, c)-selectable, we get for a set A distributed like R(x) and an arbitrary element
e ∈ N :
Pr[e ∈ π¯(A) | e ∈ A] = Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ,x ∀ I ⊆ A, I ∈ Fπ,x | e ∈ A]
= Pr[I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ,x ∀ I ⊆ A, I ∈ Fπ,x] ≥ c .
The last inequality implies, by definition, that π¯ is a (b, c)-balanced CRS.
Next, let us prove that π¯ is monotone. Fix an instantiation of Fπ,x, an element e ∈ N and two sets
e ∈ A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ N . If e ∈ π¯(A2), then we know that I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ,x for every I ⊆ A2, I ∈ Fπ,x. Thus,
clearly, I ∪ {e} ∈ Fπ,x for every I ⊆ A1 ⊆ A2, I ∈ Fπ,x, which implies e ∈ π¯(A1). In summary, we got
that:
e ∈ π¯(A2)⇒ e ∈ π¯(A1) ,
and thus, even when we do not fix the instantiation of Fπ,x:
Pr[e ∈ π¯(A2)] ≤ Pr[e ∈ π¯(A1)] ,
which completes the proof that π¯ is monotone.
To continue the proof of Theorem 1.10 we need to state some known results. The following lemma
follows from the work of [10] (mostly from Theorem 1.3 in that work).
Lemma 3.5. For every given non-negative submodular function f : 2N → R≥0, there exists a function
ηf : 2
N → 2N that always returns a subset of its argument (i.e., ηf (S) ⊆ S for every S ⊆ N ) having the
following property. For every monotone (b, c)-balanced CRS π for a polytope P and input vector x ∈ bP :
E[f(ηf (π(R(x))))] ≥ c · F (x) ,
where F (x) is the multilinear extension of f .
The following two known lemmata about submodular functions have been rephrased to make them fit
our notation better.
Lemma 3.6 (Lemma 2.2 of [12]). Let g : 2N → R be a submodular function, and let T be an arbitrary set
T ⊆ N . For every random set Tp ⊆ T which contains every element of T with probability p (not necessarily
independently):
E[g(Tp)] ≥ (1− p)g(∅) + p · g(T ) .
Lemma 3.7 (Lemma 2.2 of [5]). Let g : 2N → R≥0 be a non-negative submodular function. For every
random set Np ⊆ N which contains every element of N with probability at most p (not necessarily inde-
pendently):
E[g(Np)] ≥ (1− p)g(∅) .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.10.
Proof of Theorem 1.10. Let π¯ be the characteristic CRS of the OCRS π we consider, and let A ∼ R(x) be
the set of active elements. For notational convenience, let us also denote by S′ the set ηf (π¯(A)). Notice that
S′ is a subset of the set S of accepted elements since π¯(A) is a subset of S by Observation 3.3. Lemmata 3.4
and 3.5 imply together the inequality E[f(S′)] = E[f(ηf (π¯(A)))] ≥ c · F (x). To complete the proof of the
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first part of the theorem, it is now enough to observe that by the monotonicity of f : E[f(S)] ≥ E[f(S′)] ≥
c · F (x).
To prove the second part of the theorem, let us fix the set A and the family Fπ,x which, for brevity, we
denote byFx in the rest of the proof. Observe that the set S′ is deterministic once A and Fx are fixed, and let
us denote this set by S′A,Fx . Hence, we can think of S(1/2) as obtained by first calculating a set S
′
A,Fx
(1/2)
containing every element of S′A,Fx with probability 1/2, independently, and then adding to it a random set
∆ ⊆ N \ S′A,Fx . By controlling the order in which elements reveal whether they are active, the adversary
can make the distribution of ∆ depend on S′A,Fx(1/2); however, ∆ is guaranteed to contain every element
with probability at most 1/2 for every given choice of S′A,Fx(1/2). Using this observation we get:
E[f(S(1/2)) | A,Fx] = E[f(S
′(1/2) ∪∆) | A,Fx]
=
∑
B⊆S′
A,Fx
Pr[S′A,Fx(1/2) = B | A,Fx] · E[f(B ∪∆) | S
′
A,Fx(1/2) = B,A,Fx]
≥
∑
B⊆S′
A,Fx
Pr[S′A,Fx(1/2) = B | A,Fx] ·
E[f(B) | A,Fx]
2
=
E[f(S′(1/2)) | A,Fx]
2
≥
E[f(S′) | A,Fx]
4
,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.7 since the function hB(T ) = f(B ∪ T ) is non-negative
and submodular for every set B ⊆ N , and the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.6. Taking an
expectation over the possible values of the set A and the family Fx, we get:
E[f(S(1/2))] = EA,Fx [E[f(S(1/2)) | A,Fx]]
≥ EA,Fx
[
E[f(S′) | A,Fx]
4
]
=
E[f(S′)]
4
≥ (c/4) · F (x) .
Notice that the result proved by Theorem 1.10 for non-monotone functions loses a factor of 4 in the
guarantee. To avoid that, we also consider online adversaries. Unfortunately, we do not have an improved
result for greedy OCRSs against online adversaries. Instead, we study the performance of a different family
of ORCSs against such adversaries.
Definition 3.8 (element-monotone OCRS). An element-monotone OCRS is an OCRS characterized by a
down-closed family Fu ⊆ 2N\{e} for every element e ∈ N , where the families {Fe}e∈N can be either
deterministic (a deterministic element-monotone OCRS) or taken from some joint distribution (a randomized
element-monotone OCRS). Such an OCRS accepts an active element e if and only if A<e ∈ Fe, where A<e
is the set of active elements that revealed that they are active before e does so.
One can observe that all the results we prove for greedy OCRSs in this paper can be easily applied also
to element-monotone OCRSs with the following modified definition of (b, c)-selectability.
Definition 3.9 ((b, c)-selectability for element-monotone OCRSs). Let b, c ∈ [0, 1]. An element-monotone
OCRS for P is (b, c)-selectable if for any x ∈ b · P we have
Pr[R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe] ≥ c ∀e ∈ N .
Moreover, the greedy OCRSs we describe for specific polytopes can be converted into similar element-
monotone OCRSs with the same (b, c)-selectability guarantee (in fact the greedy OCRS we describe for
matroids is already an element-monotone OCRS without any modifications). Our objective in the rest of
this section is to prove the next theorem. Notice that Theorem 1.11 is a special case of this theorem.
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Theorem 3.10. Given an element-monotone (b, c)-selectable OCRS π and a non-negative submodular func-
tion f : 2N → R≥0, there exists an OCRS π′ that for every input vector x ∈ bP and online adversary selects
a random set S such that E[f(S))] ≥ c · F (x).
To prove Theorem 3.10, we need some notation. Let σa denote an arbitrary fixed absolute order over the
elements of N . Given element e ∈ N and a vector y ∈ [0, 1]N , let F (e | y) denote the marginal contribution
obtained by increasing the coordinate of e in y to 1. Formally, F (e | y) = F (y ∨ 1{e})− F (y). Finally, we
say that x is non-reducible if F (e | x ∧ 1σ<ea ) ≥ 0 for every element e ∈ N having xe > 0, where σ
<e
a is
the set of elements that appear before e in the order σa.
Observation 3.11. If x is reducible, then there exists a non-reducible vector x′ ≤ x obeying F (x′) ≥ F (x).
Proof. Consider the vector x′ obtained from x by the following process. Start with x′ ← x. Scan the
elements in the order σa. For every element e, if F (e | x′ ∧ 1σ<ea ) < 0, then reduce x
′
e to 0. Clearly this
process ends up with a non-reducible vector x′. Moreover, every step of the process only increases the value
of F (x′), and thus, this value ends up at least as large as its initial value F (x). To see why this is the case,
consider a step in which the value of x′e is reduced to 0 for some element e ∈ N , and let x1 and x2 be the
vector x′ before and after the reduction. Then,
F (x1) = f(∅) +
∑
e′∈N
x1e′ · F (e
′ | x1 ∧ 1
σ<e
′
a
) ≤ f(∅) +
∑
e′∈N\{e}
x1e′ · F (e
′ | x1 ∧ 1
σ<e
′
a
)
≤ f(∅) +
∑
e′∈N\{e}
x1e′ · F (e
′ | x2 ∧ 1
σ<e
′
a
) = F (x2) ,
where the first inequality holds since F (e | x1 ∧ 1σ<ea ) < 0, and the second inequality holds by submodu-
larity.
Observation 3.11 shows that it is enough to prove Theorem 3.10 for non-reducible x. If x is reducible,
the OCRS π′ can calculate a non-reducible x′ having F (x′) ≥ F (x), and then “pretend” that some active
elements are in fact inactive in a way that makes every element e active with probability x′e, independently.
Determining x′ requires exponential time, but even if one wants a polynomial time OCRS π′ it is possible
to use sampling to get, for every constant d > 0, a non-reducible vector x′ having F (x′) ≥ F (x)− |N |−d ·
max{f({e}) | xe > 0}.
The OCRS π′ we use in the proof of Theorem 3.10 works as follows: whenever π′ learns that an element
e is active it complements the set A<e to have the distribution R(x ∧ 1N\{e}), and then checks whether the
resulting random set is in Fe. More formally, let σ be the order in which the elements reveal whether they
are active, and let σ>e be the set of elements that appears after e in the order σ. Then, when e reveals that
it is active, the OCRS π′ decides to accept it if A<e ∪ R(x ∧ 1σ>e) ∈ Fe (for a random realization of the
random set R(x ∧ 1σ>e).
Observation 3.12. The OCRS π′ always selects a set S ∈ F .
Proof. Fix the set A of active elements, the families {Fe}e∈N and the order σ in which elements reveal
whether they are active. We prove that the observation holds for any possible choice for these fixed values.
Let S′ be the set of elements selected by π. The fact that π′ selects some element e ∈ N (i.e., e ∈ S)
means that (S ∩ σ<e) ∪ R(x ∧ 1σ>e) ∈ Fe for some realization of the random set R(x ∧ 1σ>e). Hence,
S ∩ σ<e ∈ Fe, which implies that π also selects e (i.e., e ∈ S′). This argument implies that S ⊆ S′. The
observation now follows by the down-monotonicity of F since π always returns a set in F .
Next, we need to prove the following technical lemma.
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Lemma 3.13. Let X1,X2 be two random sets that never contain elements e, e′ ∈ N . Additionally, let Y1
and Y2 be two random sets distributed like R(x ∧ 1{e′}) which are independent from each other and from
X1, X2 and Fe. Then, assuming Pr[X2 ∈ Fe] > 0,
E[f(e | X1 ∪ Y1) | X2 ∪ Y2 ∈ Fe] ≤ E[f(e | X1 ∪ Y1) | X2 ∪ Y1 ∈ Fe] .
Proof. It is enough to prove the lemma for fixed values of X1, X2 and Fe obeying X2 ∈ Fe. If X2∪{e′} ∈
Fe, then the conditions X2 ∪ Y2 ∈ Fe and X2 ∪ Y1 ∈ Fe always hold and the lemma is trivial, thus, we also
assume X2 ∪ {e
′} 6∈ Fe. Then, conditioned on the values of X1, X2 and Fe:
E[f(e | X1 ∪ Y1) | X2 ∪ Y2 ∈ Fe] ≤ E[f(e | X1) | X2 ∪ Y2 ∈ Fe] = E[f(e | X1) | Y2 = ∅]
= E[f(e | X1 ∪ Y1) | Y1 = ∅]
= E[f(e | X1 ∪ Y1) | X2 ∪ Y1 ∈ Fe] ,
where the inequality holds by submodularity.
Using the last lemma we can now prove the following one, which lower bounds the contribution of an
element e to the value of the solution selected by π′.
Lemma 3.14. Let A ∼ R(x) be the set of active elements, and let S be the output of π′ given A and
an arbitrary online adversary. Then, for every element e ∈ N having xe > 0 and Pr[∅ ∈ Fe] > 0,
Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A] = Pr[R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe] and E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S] ≥ F (e | x ∧ 1σ<ea ).
Proof. Observe that the conditions xe > 0 and Pr[∅ ∈ Fe] > 0 are equivalent to Pr[e ∈ S] > 0, and
thus, the second expectation we want to bound is well defined for every element e having xe > 0 and
Pr[∅ ∈ Fe] > 0.
The strategy of an online adversary for determining the order in which elements reveal whether they are
active, up to the point when the element e does so, can be characterized by a binary tree with the following
properties:
• Every leaf is marked by e.
• Every internal node is marked by some other element e′ 6= e and has two children called the “accepted
child” and the “rejected child”.
• The path from the root of the tree to every leaf does not contain a single element more than once.
The semantics of understanding the tree as a strategy are as follows. The adversary starts at the root of the
tree, and moves slowly down the tree till reaching a leaf. When the adversary is at some node e′ it makes e′
the next element that reveals whether it is active. If e′ is accepted by the OCRS, then the adversary moves to
its “accepted child”, otherwise it moves to its “rejected child”. Notice that strategies defined by such trees
do not allow the adversary to use the information whether e′ was active or not when the OCRS rejects it,
however, since the activation of elements is independent and our OCRS behaves in the same way under both
cases, this information cannot help the adversary.
In the rest of this proof, we show by induction on the number of leafs in the strategy of the adversary
that the lemma holds for every online adversary. Let us start with the case of the single strategy having a
single leaf. In this strategy the adversary makes e the first element to reveal whether it is active. This means
that:
Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A] = Pr[R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe] ,
and
E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S] = E[f(e | A ∩ σ
<e
a ) | R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe, e ∈ A]
= E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea )] = F (e | x ∧ 1σ<ea ) ,
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where the second equality holds since A∩σ<ea is independent of the conditions R(x)\{e} ∈ Fe and e ∈ A.
Next, assume the lemma holds for strategies having ℓ − 1 ≥ 1 leaves, and let us prove it for a strategy
T having ℓ leaves. Since every internal node of T has two children, T must contain a node w (marked by
an element e′ 6= e) having two leaves as children. Let T ′ be the strategy resulting from T by removing the
two children of w and making w itself a leaf (by marking it with e). Since T ′ has ℓ− 1 leaves, it obeys the
lemma by the induction hypothesis. Hence, it is enough to show that Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A] is identical under
both T and T ′ and E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S] is at least as large under T as under T ′.
Let χw be the event that the adversary reaches the node w in its strategy. Clearly Pr[χw | T ] = Pr[χw |
T ′], where by conditioning a probability on a strategy of the adversary we mean that the probability is
calculated for the case that the adversary uses this strategy. If the last two probabilities are strictly smaller
than 1 we also have:
Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,¬χw,T ] = Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,¬χw,T
′] .
On the other hand, observe that for both strategies T and T ′ the event χw implies the same (deterministic)
fixed values for the set Bw of the elements that revealed whether they are active up to the point that the
adversary reached w, and the set Aw = A ∩Bw. Thus, whenever Pr[χw | T ] = Pr[χw | T ′] > 0:
Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,χw,T
′] = Pr[Aw ∪ (R(x) \ (Bw ∪ {e})) ∈ Fe]
= Pr[Aw ∪ (A ∩ {e
′}) ∪ (R(x) \ (Bw ∪ {e, e
′})) ∈ Fe] = Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,χw,T ] .
In conclusion, we got: Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,T ] = Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,T ′]. Notice that both probabilities must
be strictly positive by the induction hypothesis.
By Bayes’ law we now get:
Pr[χw | T , e ∈ S] = Pr[χw | e ∈ A,T , e ∈ S] = Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,T , χw] ·
Pr[χw | e ∈ A,T ]
Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,T ]
= Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,T ′, χw] ·
Pr[χw | e ∈ A,T
′]
Pr[e ∈ S | e ∈ A,T ′]
= Pr[χw | e ∈ A,T
′, e ∈ S] = Pr[χw | T
′, e ∈ S] ,
and when the probabilities Pr[χw | T , e ∈ S] = Pr[χw | T ′, e ∈ S] are strictly smaller than 1 we also have:
E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S,¬χw,T ] = E[f(e | A ∩ σ
<e
a ) | e ∈ S,¬χw,T
′] .
Hence, to prove that E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S] is at least as large under T as under T ′ we are only left to
show the inequality:
E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S, χw,T ] ≥ E[f(e | A ∩ σ
<e
a ) | e ∈ S, χw,T
′]
whenever Pr[χw | T , e ∈ S] > 0. The last inequality holds since:
E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S, χw,T
′]
= E
[
f(e | (Aw ∪ (A \Bw)) ∩ σ
<e
a )
∣∣∣ Aw ∪ ((R(x) \Bw) \ {e}) ∈ Fe]
≤ E
[
f(e | (Aw ∪ (A \Bw)) ∩ σ
<e
a )
∣∣∣ Aw ∪ (A ∩ {e′}) ∪ ((R(x) \Bw) \ {e′, e}) ∈ Fe]
= E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S, χw,T ] ,
where the inequality holds by Lemma 3.13.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.10.
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Proof of Theorem 3.10. If c = 0, then the theorem is trivial. Thus, we may assume c > 0. Recall that S
is the set produced by the OCRS π′, and let A ∼ R(x) be the set of active elements. Since, π is a (b, c)-
selectable element-monotone contention resolution scheme, A \ {e} must belong to Fe, for every element
e ∈ N , with a positive probability. By the down-monotonicity of Fe, we get that ∅ ∈ Fe for every e ∈ N .
Next, observe that:
E[f(S)] = f(∅) +
∑
e∈N,xe>0
Pr[e ∈ S] · E[f(e | S ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S]
≥ f(∅) +
∑
e∈N,xe>0
Pr[e ∈ S] · E[f(e | A ∩ σ<ea ) | e ∈ S]
≥ f(∅) +
∑
e∈N,xe>0
Pr[R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe, e ∈ A] · F (e | x ∧ 1σ<ea )
= f(∅) +
∑
e∈N,xe>0
xe · Pr[R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe] · F (e | x ∧ 1σ<ea ) .
where the first inequality holds by submodularity and the second by Lemma 3.14. Since π is a (b, c)-
selectable contention resolution scheme, the probability Pr[R(x) \ {e} ∈ Fe] must be at least c for every
element e ∈ N . Additionally, since we assumed that x is non-reducible, we also have F (e | x ∩ 1σ<ea ) ≥ 0
for every element e ∈ N obeying xe > 0. Plugging both observations into the previous inequality gives:
E[f(S)] ≥ f(∅) +
∑
e∈N,xe>0
c · xe · F (e | x ∧ 1σ<ea ) = c · F (x) + (1− c) · f(∅) ≥ c · F (x) .
4 Details on applications
In this section we prove the theorems stated in Section 1.3 and provide some additional information. We
reuse notation introduced in Section 1.3.
4.1 Prophet inequalities for Bayesian online selection problems
Proof of Theorem 1.12
We start by introducing a relaxation for the expected value of the prophet, i.e., E[max{
∑
e∈S Ze | S ∈ F}].
Similar relaxation techniques to the one we use here have been been used previously for different related
problems (see, e.g., [24]).
Let I∗ ∈ argmax{
∑
e∈I Zi | I ∈ F} be an optimal (random) set for the prophet, and we define
p∗e = Pr[e ∈ I
∗] for e ∈ N . Our relaxation seeks probabilities pe that have the role of p∗e. Observe first
that since I∗ ∈ F with probability 1, we have that p∗ is a convex combination of characteristic vectors of
feasible sets, and hence, p∗ ∈ P (we recall that P is a relaxation for F).
Our relaxation assigns an optimistic objective value to each probability vector p ∈ P . More precisely,
for any e ∈ N we assume in the relaxation that element e gets selected when Ze takes one of its pe-fraction
of highest values. In particular, if Ze follows a continuous distribution with cumulative distribution function
Fe, then we assume that Ze gets selected whenever Ze ≥ qe := F−1e (1 − pe) and, consequently, the
contribution of e to the objective of the prophet is ge(pe) =
∫∞
qe
x · dFe(x). More generally, when Ze does
not follow a continuous distribution, the expected value of Ze on the highest pe-fraction of realizations can
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be described as follows:
ge(pe) = (pe − (1− Fe(qe))) · qe +
∫
x∈(qe,∞)
x · dFe(x), where
qe = qe(pe) = min{α | Fe(α) ≥ 1− pe} .
In words, we assume that e gets selected whenever Ze > qe. Moreover, if Ze = qe, then e gets selected with
probability pe − 1 + Fe(qe).
Putting things together, the relaxation we consider is the following.
max
p∈P
∑
e∈N
ge(pe) (4)
By the above discussion this is indeed a relaxation. Moreover, one can easily observe that ge is a concave
functions, and thus, in many settings one can efficiently obtain a near-optimal solution to this relaxation
using convex optimization techniques. However, if we are only interested in proving the existence of a
prophet inequality as stated in Theorem 1.12, we do not need an efficient procedure to solve (4).
Let x ∈ P be an optimal solution to (4). We now create an algorithm for the Bayesian online selection
problem based on the point x ∈ P and the c-selectable OCRS for P which exists by assumption. Whenever
an element e ∈ N reveals in the Bayesian online selection problem we say that e is active if its random
variable Ze realizes within the largest xe-fraction of realizations. More formally, e is active if either:
(i) Ze > qe(x), or
(ii) if Ze = qe(x) (assuming Pr[Ze = qe(x)] > 0), we toss a coin and declare e to be active with
probability xe−1+Fe(qe(x))Pr[Ze=qe(x)] .
Let A ⊆ N be the random set of active elements. Observe that A is distributed like R(x), the random subset
of N that contains each element e ∈ N with probability xe independently of the others. Also, by definition
of active elements we have
E[Ze · 1e∈A] = ge(xe) ∀e ∈ N . (5)
Our algorithm for the Bayesian online selection problem applies a c-selectable OCRS to the set A to obtain a
random set I ⊆ A, I ∈ F . To prove the theorem, we show that the expected value of I is at least a c-fraction
of the optimal value of (4), i.e., E[∑e∈I Ze] ≥ c ·∑e∈N ge(xe).
Since the OCRS is c-selectable, we have
Pr[e ∈ I] ≥ c · xe ∀e ∈ N . (6)
A key observation is that the distribution of Ze conditioned on e ∈ I is the same as the distribution of Ze
conditioned on e ∈ A. This follows from the fact that the OCRS does not consider the precise value of Ze,
but only knows whether e ∈ A or not. In particular, this implies
E[Ze | e ∈ I] = E[Ze | e ∈ A] ∀e ∈ N . (7)
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Combining the above observations we get
E
[∑
e∈I
Ze
]
=
∑
e∈N
Pr[e ∈ I] · E[Ze | e ∈ I]
≥ c ·
∑
e∈N
xe · E[Ze | e ∈ A] (by (6) and (7))
= c ·
∑
e∈N
Pr[e ∈ A] · E[Ze · 1e∈A | e ∈ A] (since Pr[e ∈ A] = xe)
= c ·
∑
e∈N
ge(xe) (by (5)) .
The last inequality shows that our procedure is worse by at most a factor of c compared to the value of the
relaxation (4), which completes the proof.
4.2 Oblivious posted pricing mechanisms
Proof of Theorem 1.15
The proof for Theorem 1.15 goes along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1.12 presented in Section 4.1,
but uses a different relaxation. The relaxation we employ is the same as the one used by Yan [24]. For
completeness and ease of understanding we replicate some of the arguments in [24] and refer to the excellent
discussion of this relaxation in [24] for more details about it.
Consider the random set of agents I∗ ⊆ N, I∗ ∈ F served by Myerson’s mechanism, i.e., an optimal
truthful mechanism, and let q∗e = Pr[e ∈ I∗] be the probability that e gets served. Since only feasible
subsets of agents can be served, we have q∗ ∈ P , because P is a relaxation of F .
For this fixed q∗ we can now define independent mechanism design problems for the different agents
as follows. For each e ∈ N , we are interested in finding a price distribution (for the price offered to e),
that maximizes the expected revenue under the constraint that e gets served with probability equal to q∗e .
Based on results by Myerson [22], it follows that the optimal price distribution can be chosen to be a two-
price distribution, which can be determined through a well-known technique in mechanism design known as
ironing (we refer to [24] for details). We denote by Re(q∗e) the expected revenue of this optimal distribution,
which can be shown to be concave in q∗e , and by De(q∗e) the distribution itself. Since the family of these
independent mechanism design problems for the agents is less constrained than the original BSMD, in which
we also had to make sure that the set of all served agents is in F , we have that
∑
e∈N Re(q
∗
e) is an upper
bound to the expected revenue of an optimal mechanism for the original BSMD (we refer to [24] for a formal
proof). Hence, the following is a convex relaxation of the original BSMD.
max
{∑
e∈N
Re(qe)
∣∣∣∣∣ q ∈ P
}
(8)
The COPM we construct needs probabilities x ∈ P such that
∑
e∈N Re(xe) is an upper bound on the
revenue of Myerson’s mechanism. By the above discussion, this holds for x = q∗, or for x being an optimal
solution to (8). To make this step constructive one can follow, for example, the sampling-based approach
of Chawla et al. [9]; they estimate the probabilities q∗ by running Myerson’s mechanism sufficiently many
times. Alternatively, one could use convex optimization techniques to optimize the relaxation (8).11 Our
11We highlight that even if only an approximately optimal x ∈ P can be obtained, i.e., one such that α ·
∑
e∈N Re(xe) upper
bounds the optimal revenue for some α > 1, then all of what follows still goes through simply with an additional loss of a factor
α. This will lead to a COPM that is at most a factor of α · c worse than Myerson’s mechanism.
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COPM is randomized and defined by the following randomization over tuples (p,F ′). The price vector
p ∈ RN≥0 is drawn according to the product distribution×e∈N De(xe), where each pe for e ∈ N is drawn
independently according to the two-price distribution De(xe). The family F ′ is chosen to be equal to the
family Fx of the c-selectable OCRS for the point x ∈ P . Hence, if our OCRS is deterministic, then also
F ′ = Fx is deterministic, in which case the randomization of our COPM is solely on the price vector p.
To prove Theorem 1.15 we show that our COPM has an expected revenue of at least c ·
∑
e∈N Re(xe).
We call an agent e ∈ N active if its personal (random) valuation Ze is at least as large as the (random)
price pe. In other words, we say that e is active if it would accept the offer presented by our COPM. By the
definition of the distributions De(xe), we have that each agent e is active with probability xe, independently
of all other agents. Notice that an agent e ∈ N being active does not imply that e gets selected, because a
COPM is allowed to reject an agent if feasibility in F ′ is not maintained. However, because our OCRS is
c-selectable, we have that for any e ∈ N with probability at least c, the agent e can be added to the agents
served so far no matter which subset of the active agents has been already served; furthermore, this event is
independent of whether e is active itself. The expected revenue that our COPM gets from agent e is therefore
at least c · Re(xe), which completes the proof.
Extension to other objectives
Finally, we notice that, as highlighted by Yan [24], the used relaxation can easily be extended to a much
larger class of objective functions that are decomposable with respect to the agents. More precisely, these
are objectives of the form E[∑e∈N 1Ze≥pe · ge(Ze, pe)], where for e ∈ N , ge is a function of the (random)
valuation Ze of e and the price pe offered to e. In particular, the maximization of revenue which we dis-
cussed above corresponds to ge(Ze, pe) = pe. Similarly, one can deal with welfare maximization or surplus
maximization by defining ge(Ze, pe) = Ze and ge(Ze, pe) = Ze − pe, respectively. The above reasoning
why our COPM is at most a factor of c worse than the optimal truthful mechanism extends to such objectives
without modifications.
4.3 Stochastic probing
We begin with the proof of Theorem 1.17. Consider the following relaxation. We use w in the relaxation
to denote the natural extension of w to vectors (formally, w(x) = ∑e∈N w(e) · xe). Additionally, the
relaxation uses the expression p ◦ x to denote the element-wise multiplication of the probabilities vector p
and the variables vector x. Clearly this relaxation can be solved efficiently when there is a separation oracle
for the polytopes Pin and Pout.
(R1) max w(p ◦ x)
p ◦ x ∈ Pin
x ∈ Pout
x ∈ [0, 1]N
The following lemma proves an important property of (R1). The proof of this lemma is based on the
observation that one feasible solution for (R1) is the vector x ∈ [0, 1]N in which xe is equal to the marginal
probability that the optimal algorithm probes element e.
Lemma 4.1 (Claim 3.1 of [17]). The optimal value of (R1) upper bounds the the expected performance of
the optimal algorithm for the weighted stochastic probing problem.
Let x∗ be an optimal solution for (R1). By Lemma 4.1, to prove Theorem 1.17 we only need to show
an algorithm for the weighted stochastic probing problem which finds a solution of expected weight at least
b(cin · cout) ·w(p ◦x
∗). Our algorithm for the weighted stochastic probing problem is given as Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Probing Algorithm
1 Let Aout be a random set distributed like R(bx∗).
2 Let Fˆout ⊆ Fout be an instantiation of the random family Fπout,bx∗ .
3 Let Fˆin ⊆ Fin be an instantiation of the random family Fπin,p◦(bx∗).
4 Let Q,S ← ∅.
5 for every element e ∈ N in the order chosen by the adversary do
6 if e ∈ Aout, S ∪ {e} ∈ Fˆin and Q ∪ {e} ∈ Fˆout then
7 Add e to Q and probe e.
8 if e is active then Add e to S.
9 return S.
The next observation shows that Algorithm 1 is a legal algorithm for the weighted stochastic probing
problem.
Observation 4.2. The following always hold when Algorithm 1 terminates:
• The set Q of probed elements is in Fˆout ⊆ Fout.
• The set S of selected elements is in Fˆin ⊆ Fin.
• The set S contains exactly the active elements of Q.
In the rest of the section we use notation and results introduced in Section 3. Let π¯in and π¯out denote the
characteristic CRSs of the greedy OCRSs πin and πout, respectively. We would like to use π¯in and π¯out to
lower bound the value of a subset of S, and through that subset also the value of S. To achieve that objective
we first need to describe the said subset of S as an expression of π¯in and π¯out.
Let Ain be the set of elements that belong to Aout and are also active. One can observe that Ain is
distributed like R(p ◦ x). Additionally, let us couple the randomness of Algorithm 1 and the CRSs π¯in and
π¯out as follows: we use the same instantiations for the random families Fπin,p◦(bx∗) and Fπout,bx∗ in both
Algorithm 1 and the definitions of π¯in and π¯out, respectively. Notice that this coupling implies:
π¯in(Ain) = {e ∈ Ain | I ∪ {e} ∈ Fˆin ∀I ⊆ Ain, I ∈ Fˆin}
and
π¯out(Aout) = {e ∈ Aout | I ∪ {e} ∈ Fˆout ∀I ⊆ Aout, I ∈ Fˆout} .
Observation 4.3. π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) ⊆ S.
Proof. Consider an element e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout). Since e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ⊆ Ain, e must be both active
and in Aout. Let Se and Qe denote the sets S and Q immediately before e is processed by Algorithm 1.
Clearly Se ⊆ Ain and Se ∈ Fˆin. Together with the fact that e ∈ π¯in(Ain), these observations imply that
Se ∪ {e} ∈ Fˆin. An analogous arguments shows also that Qe ∪ {e} ∈ Fˆout. Hence, we proved that e is
an active element obeying all the conditions on Line 6 when processed by Algorithm 1, and therefore, e is
added to S by the algorithm.
We defined Aout as a random set distributed like R(bx∗) and Ain as the intersection of Aout and the
set of active elements. However, for the purpose of analyzing the value of the set π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout)
we can assume any construction procedure that results in the same joint distribution of Ain and Aout. The
following is a convenient construction that we are going to use from this point on: the set Ain is a random
set distributed like R(p ◦ (bx∗)). The set Aout is calculated by starting with Ain and adding to it every
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element e 6∈ Ain with probability bx∗e(1 − pe)/(1 − bpex∗e), independently. Notice that this construction
indeed produces the same joint distribution of the sets Ain and Aout as the original construction. For ease of
notation, let us denote by z a vector in [0, 1]N defined by: ze = bx∗e(1− pe)/(1 − bpex∗e) for every e ∈ N .
Using this notation we get that Aout has the same distribution as Ain ∪R(z).
The new construction of Aout implies that Aout is a random function of Ain, and so is the expression
π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout). Thus, we can define a new CRS π¯ for Pin by the equality π¯(Ain) = π¯in(Ain) ∩
π¯out(Aout). Notice that π¯ is a true CRS for Pin in the sense that it always outputs a set in Fin since π¯in(Ain)
is guaranteed to be in Fin. Let us now study the properties of π¯.
Lemma 4.4. The CRS π¯ is monotone.
Proof. We need to show that every element e ∈ N and two sets e ∈ T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ N obey the inequality:
Pr[e ∈ π¯(Ain) | Ain = T1] = Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) | Ain = T1]
≥ Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) | Ain = T2] = Pr[e ∈ π¯(Ain) | Ain = T2] .
This is true since:
Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) | Ain = T1] = Pr[e ∈ π¯in(T1) ∩ π¯out(T1 ∪R(z))]
= Pr[e ∈ π¯in(T1)] · Pr[e ∈ π¯out(T1 ∪R(z))] ≥ Pr[e ∈ π¯in(T2)] · Pr[e ∈ π¯out(T2 ∪R(z))]
=Pr[e ∈ π¯in(T2) ∩ π¯out(T2 ∪R(z))] = Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) | Ain = T2] ,
where the inequality follows since both π¯in and π¯out are monotone by Lemma 3.4.
The following lemma shows that π¯ obeys a weak variant of balanceness.
Definition 4.5. A CRS π for a polytope P is (x, c)-balanced for a vector x and c ∈ [0, 1] if Pr[e ∈ π(R(x)) |
e ∈ R(x)] ≥ c for every element e ∈ N having xe > 0.
Lemma 4.6. The CRS π¯ is (p ◦ (bx∗), cin · cout)-balanced.
Proof. Since Ain is distributed like R(p ◦ (bx∗)), we need to show that Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain)∩ π¯out(Aout) | e ∈
Ain] ≥ c1 · c2 holds for every element e ∈ N having bpex∗e > 0.
Since π¯in and π¯out are monotone by Lemma 3.4, we get that both Pr[e ∈ π¯in(T )] and Pr[e ∈ π¯out(T ∪
R(z))] are decreasing functions of T as long as e is in T . Thus, by the FKG inequality:
Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) | e ∈ Ain] = Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Ain ∪R(z)) | e ∈ Ain]
≥ Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) | e ∈ Ain] · Pr[e ∈ π¯out(Ain ∪R(z)) | e ∈ Ain]
= Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) | e ∈ Ain] · Pr[e ∈ π¯out(Aout) | e ∈ Aout] ,
where the last equality uses the fact that the membership of every element in the sets Ain and R(z) is
independent from the membership of other elements in these sets.
The set Ain is distributed like R(p ◦ (bx∗)) and the vector p ◦ (bx∗) is inside the polytope bPin. Thus,
since π¯in is (b, cin)-balanced by Lemma 3.4, we get: Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Ain) | e ∈ Ain] ≥ cin. Similarly, the
set Aout is distributed like R(bx∗) and the vector bx∗ is inside the polytope bPout. Thus, since π¯out is
(b, cout)-balanced by Lemma 3.4, we get: Pr[e ∈ π¯in(Aout) | e ∈ Aout] ≥ cout. The lemma now follows
by combining the above inequalities.
In the following corollary we use w to denote its natural extension to sets, i.e., w(T ) =
∑
e∈T w(e).
Corollary 4.7. E[w(S)] ≥ b(cin · cout) · w(p ◦ x∗).
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Proof. By Lemma 4.6, linearity of the expectation and the observation that Ain is distributed like R(p ◦
(bx∗)), we get:
E[w(π¯(Ain))] =
∑
e∈N
w(e) · Pr[e ∈ π¯(R(p ◦ (bx∗)))]
=
∑
e∈N
w(e) · Pr[e ∈ R(p ◦ (bx∗))] · Pr[e ∈ π¯(R(p ◦ (bx∗))) | e ∈ R(p ◦ (bx∗))]
≥
∑
e∈N
w(e) · (pe ◦ (bx
∗
e)) · (cin · cout) = b(cin · cout) · w(p ◦ x
∗) .
Since all the weights are non-negative and π¯(Ain) = π¯in(Ain) ∩ π¯out(Aout) ⊆ S by Observation 4.3, the
last inequality implies E[w(S)] ≥ E[w(π¯(Ain))] ≥ b(cin · cout) · w(p ◦ x∗).
Following the above discussion, Theorem 1.17 is implied by the last corollary. We can now prove
Theorem 1.18 as a direct consequence of Theorem 1.17.
Proof of Theorem 1.18. Consider a down-closed set F ⊆ 2N containing every set T ⊆ N if and only if all
the elements of T can be queried while respecting the deadlines. Formally,
F =
{
T ⊆ 2N
∣∣∣ ∀1≤d≤|N | |{e ∈ T | de ≤ d}| ≤ d} .
By definition (N,F) is a laminar matroid, thus, by Theorem 1.8 there exists a (b, 1 − b)-selectable greedy
OCRS for its matroid polytope PF . Together with the existence of πout we get, by Theorem 1.9, a (b, (1 −
b)cout)-selectable greedy OCRS for the polytope P ′out = Pout∩PF . Notice that this polytope is a relaxation
of the down-closed family F ′out = Fout ∩ F . Moreover, P ′out has a separation oracle whenever Pout has
such an oracle.
For convenience, let us use (F1,F2)-probing as a shorthand for the weighted stochastic probing problem
with F1 and F2 as the inner and outer constraints, respectively. Consider the best algorithm for (Fin,Fout)-
probing with deadlines. Since this algorithm probes with respect to the deadlines, the set of elements it
probes must be in F . Hence, the same algorithm is also an algorithm for (Fin,F ′out)-probing. Thus, by
Theorem 1.17 we have an algorithm ALG for (Fin,F ′out)-probing whose approximation ratio is b(1−b)·cin ·
cout compared to the best algorithm for (Fin,Fout)-probing with deadlines. Moreover, the approximation
ratio of ALG holds regardless of the order in which ALG can probe elements.
The algorithm we suggest for (Fin,Fout)-probing with deadlines is ALG when we allow it to probe
elements in increasing deadlines order. We have already proved that ALG has the approximation ratio
guaranteed by the theorem, so we only need to explain why does it respect the deadlines. Assume towards
a contradiction that ALG probes element e after time de. This means that ALG probes a set T of at least
de elements before it probes e. However, since ALG can probe elements only in increasing deadlines order,
all the elements of T ∪ {e} have a deadline of at most de. The last observation implies that T ∪ {e} 6∈ F ,
which contradicts the fact that the set of elements probed by ALG is always in F ′out ⊆ F .
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1.19. Let f : 2N → R≥0 be the non-negative
monotone submodular objective function of the problem, i.e., the value of an output S of the probing algo-
rithm is f(S). We need to introduce an extension of f to [0, 1]N studied by [6].
f+(x) = max


∑
T⊆N
αT · f(T )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
T⊆N
αT ≤ 1, αT ≥ 0 and ∀e∈N
∑
e∈T⊆N
αT ≤ xe

 .
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Intuitively, f+ is equal to the largest possible expected value of f over a distribution of sets in which
every element e appears with a marginal probability at most xe. Using this extension, we can now introduce
a variant of the relaxation (R1) that works for monotone submodular objectives.
(R2) max f+(p ◦ x)
p ◦ x ∈ Pin
x ∈ Pout
x ∈ [0, 1]N
Let us explain why we use the extension f+ in (R2) instead of the simpler multilinear extension. An
algorithm for the submodular stochastic probing may choose the next element to probe based on the set
of elements previously probed and the results of these probes. Thus, the membership of elements in the
solution produced by the algorithm is not independent, and this is captured by f+. Using this intuition, the
work of [1] implies the following counterpart of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.8. The optimal value of (R2) upper bounds the the expected performance of the optimal algorithm
for the submodular stochastic probing problem.
Additionally, [1] also shows that a variant of the continuous greedy algorithm of [7] can be used to find a
point x obeying all the constraints of (R2) and also the inequality F (p ◦x) ≥ (1− e−1) · f+(p ◦x∗), where
F is the multilinear extension of f and x∗ is the optimal solution for (R2). The same argument can also be
used to show that by stopping the continuous greedy algorithm at time b, instead of letting it reach time 1,
one gets a point x˜ ∈ [0, 1]N obeying p˜◦x ∈ bPin, x˜ ∈ bPout and F (p◦ x˜) ≥ (1−e−b−o(1)) ·f+(p◦x∗).12
The algorithm we use to prove Theorem 1.19 is Algorithm 1 modified by replacing the vector bx∗ with
x˜. Additionally, we use the same definition of the CRS π¯ given above, and observe that Lemmata 4.4 and
4.6 still apply to this CRS (with x˜ replacing bx∗ in the appropriate places). To analyze the output of this
CRS we observe that the proof of [10] for Lemma 3.5 in fact proves the following stronger version of the
lemma. Note that this version strictly generalizes Lemma 3.5 since being (b, c)-balanced is equivalent to
being (x, c)-balanced for every vector x ∈ bP .
Lemma 4.9. For every given non-negative submodular function f : 2N → R≥0, there exists a function
ηf : 2
N → 2N that always returns a subset of its argument (i.e., ηf (S) ⊆ S for every S ⊆ N ) having the
following property. For every input vector x ∈ [0, 1]N and monotone (x, c)-balanced CRS π:
E[f(ηf (π(R(x))))] ≥ c · F (x) ,
where F (x) is the multilinear extension of f .
We are now ready to prove the next lemma, which together with Lemma 4.8, proves Theorem 1.19.
Lemma 4.10. E[f(S)] ≥ (cin · cout) · F (p ◦ x˜), where S is the output set of the modified Algorithm 1.
Proof. Let S′ be the set ηf (π(Ain)) ⊆ π(Ain) = π¯in(Ain)∩ π¯out(Aout) ⊆ S. By combining Lemmata 4.4,
4.6 and 4.9 and using the observation that Ain is distributed like R(p ◦ x˜), we get:
E[f(S′)] ≥ (cin · cout) · F (p ◦ x˜) .
Using the monotonicity of f we now get: E[f(S)] ≥ E[f(S′)] ≥ (cin · cout) · F (p ◦ x˜).
12The idea of running the continuous greedy for less time instead of scaling its output was first introduced by [14].
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A Definitions of Matroidal Concepts
Recall that a matroid M = (N,F) is a tuple consisting of a finite ground set N , and a nonempty family
F ⊆ 2N of subsets of the ground set, called independent sets, which satisfy:
(i) I ⊆ J ∈ F ⇒ I ∈ F , and
(ii) I, J ∈ F , |I| > |J | ⇒ ∃e ∈ I \ J s.t. J ∪ {e} ∈ F .
The rank of a set S ⊆ 2N is the size of a maximum cardinality independent subset of S. The rank
function of the matroid M is a function rank: 2N → Z≥0 (where Z≥0 is the set of all non-negative integers)
assigning each set its rank. More formally,
rank(S) = max{|I| | I ∈ F , I ⊆ S} .
Observe that the rank of an independent set is equal to its size. The rank of the matroid M itself is defined
as rank(N). Notice that rank(S) ≤ rank(N) for every subset S ⊆ N . A set S ⊆ N is called a base of M
if it is independent and has maximum rank, i.e., |S| = rank(S) = rank(N).
We say that an element e ∈ N is spanned by a set S ⊆ N if adding e to S does not increase the rank
of S. On the other hand, the span of a subset S ⊆ N is the set of elements that are spanned by it. More
formally, the span of a set S is span(S) = {e ∈ N | rank(S + e) = rank(S)}.
Given a subset N ′ ⊆ N , the restriction of M to N ′, denoted by M |N ′ , is the matroid obtained from
M by keeping only the elements of N ′. Formally, M |N ′ is the matroid (N ′,F ∩ 2N
′
). On the other hand,
contracting N ′ in M results in another matroid, denoted by M/N ′, over the ground set N \ N ′. A set is
independent in M/N ′ if and only if adding a base of N ′ to it results in an independent set of M . It turns
31
out that this definition is independent of the base that is chosen for N ′. Formally, M/N ′ is the matroid
(N \N ′,F ′), where:
F ′ = {S ⊆ N \N ′ | rank(S ∪N ′) = |S|+ rank(N ′)} .
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